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I. INTRODUCTION
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD), through
the U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, op-
erates numerous flying clubs' on a worldwide basis. Be-
cause of the large number of aircraft and personnel
involved in military flying club activities, these clubs gen-
erate a considerable amount of aircraft accident litigation.
Like their civilian counterparts, the familiar flying clubs,
flight schools and fixed-base operators, military flying
clubs rent "low cost, light aircraft" (not to exceed 12,500
pounds) to club members for recreational purposes.'
They also provide ground and flight training programs,
which prepare students to meet the performance stan-
dards contained in the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Practical Test Standards, such as Private Pilot,
Officially called "Aero Clubs" by the Air Force and Marine Corps, "Flying
Activities" by the Army, and "Flying Clubs" by the Navy. Examples include the
"Andrews AFB Aero Club," the "Fort Bragg Flying Activity," and the "Norfolk
Navy Flying Club." Presently, the Air Force has 38 Aero Clubs, with a total of 400
aircraft and over 8,000 members; the Army has eight Flying Activities, with a total
of 60 aircraft and approximately 750 members; the Navy has 30 Flying Clubs, with
a total of 200 aircraft and over 3,500 members; and the Marine Corps has three
Aero Clubs, with a total of 38 aircraft and over 900 members. The U.S. Coast
Guard, a part of the Department of Transportation, has no flying clubs.
2 See, e.g., Air Force Reg. [hereinafter AFR] 215-12, 1-2 (Sept. 5, 1988). For
brevity, this article does not cite to all of the parallel regulations, orders, and
instructions of the four military services unless there are significant differences.
See infra note 21 for the full citation of these parallel publications.
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Commercial Pilot, Airline Transport Pilot, Flight Instruc-
tor, Instrument and Multiengine.3
Unlike their civilian counterparts, military flying clubs
are "nonappropriated fund instrumentalities" of the
United States Government,4 and are not open to the pub-
lic (membership is limited to persons with a recognized
relationship to the DOD).5 Members must comply not
only with Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), but with
military directives, regulations and instructions. 6 In han-
dling military flying club litigation, understanding these
differences is essential.
This article addresses special considerations in military
flying club litigation, including military flying club charac-
teristics, the role of commercial insurers, and defenses.
Because of the potential involvement of commercial liabil-
ity insurers in military flying club cases,7 this article
should be of interest to all aviation tort practitioners.
II. FLYING CLUB CHARACTERISTICS
The following provides a brief summary of military fly-
ing club characteristics, emphasizing the issues which fre-
quently arise in military flying club cases:
A. PURPOSE
Military flying clubs are established as recreational ac-
tivities to promote morale.8 They are designed to give eli-
gible personnel an opportunity to enjoy safe, low-cost
light aircraft operations and to develop skills in aeronau-
3 See, e.g., Navy Operating Instruction [hereinafter OPNAVINST] 1710.E, 418
(May 24, 1993). The extent of these training programs will vary from club to club,
but all clubs provide at least a private pilot curriculum. See, e.g., Army Reg. [here-
inafter AR] 215-2, 6-177 (Sept. 10, 1990) (stating that each Army Flying Activity
"must provide access to a primary ground school for all students (mandatory) and
a primary flight training program based on the curriculum outlined in FAR, part
141").
4 See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 2-9 (Sept. 5, 1988).
6 Id. 4-1.
, See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying test.
8 See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 1-2 (Sept. 5, 1988).
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tics. The clubs promote awareness and appreciation of
aviation requirements and techniques, while users enjoy a
social activity. 9
Although club aircraft may not be used for commercial
purposes,' 0 they may be used for temporary duty (TDY)
travel." Air Force Commanders may also use Aero Club
aircraft to support search and recovery operations and for
other operational missions, such as parts pickup or main-
tenance support flights, when other Air Force aircraft are
not available.' 2 Aircraft used for such "operational mis-
sions" are performing an appropriated fund (as distin-
guished from a nonappropriated fund) function.
Accordingly, they are not covered by the nonappropriated
fund liability insurance program.' 3
B. STATUS
Military flying clubs are designated as Morale, Welfare,
and Recreational (MWR) activities. 4 They are estab-
lished as membership associations, are comprised of vol-
untary members, and are generally self-supporting.' 5
They are also considered nonappropriated fund instru-
mentalities (NAFIs) of the Federal Government.' 6 As "in-
9 See, e.g., id. 1-2a(3) & (4).
lo See, e.g., id. 4-5h.
I See, e.g., id. 1-2c.
12 See id. 1-2b.
Is Id.; see infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., OPNAVINST 1710.2E, 103 (May 24, 1993).
1- See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 1-3.
16 See, e.g., Walls v. United States, 832 F.2d 93, 94 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); Wood-
side v. United States, 606 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904
(1980); Brucker v. United States, 338 F.2d 427, 428 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 937 (1965); United States v. Hainline, 315 F.2d 153, 156 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963); OPNAVINST 1710.2E, 103 (May 24, 1993). A NAFI
is generally a self-supporting instrumentality, i.e., not funded by Congressional
appropriation. Woodside, 606 F.2d at 136 n. 1 (citing United States v. Hopkins, 427
U.S. 123, 125 n.2 (1976); Johnson v. United States, 600 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir.
1979)). Nevertheless, military flying clubs do receive some appropriated support.
See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 1-3 (Sept. 5, 1988) (stating that Air Force Aero Clubs
"receive appropriated fund support as allowed by AFR 215-5"); AR 215-2, 6-
142 (Sept. 10, 1990) (stating that Army Flying Activities "are entitled to limited
financial support as stated in AR 215-1, chapter 2 and appendix C, including
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strumentalities" of the Federal Government, they may not
be incorporated under Federal or State law. Club assets
are assets of the U.S. Government.' 7
More importantly, military flying clubs share in the sov-
ereign immunity of the United States.' 8 Accordingly, any
suit based on the alleged negligence of a military flying
club, or a flying club employee acting within the scope of
his or her employment, must be brought against the
United States under the terms and conditions of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA).19
C. OPERATION
Military flying clubs are subject to "strict and pervasive
control" by the DOD.20 Each military department pub-
lishes its own regulations, instructions, and/or orders
which set forth the basic policies and procedures gov-
erning the establishment, operation, and disestablishment
of military flying clubs. 2 In addition, each military flying
club writes its own local Operating Instructions (OIs),22
hangering and tying down of aircraft at installations where adequate facilities are
available").
17 See, e.g., OPNAVINST 1710.2E, 103 (May 24, 1993).
M Mignona [sic] v. Sair Aviation, No. 85-3675, slip op. at 3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 27, 1992); see aLso Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942) (holding
that post exchange, a NAFI, shared in the sovereign immunity of the United
States); Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405, 406 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that the
Fort Knox Gun Club, a NAFI, shared in the sovereign immunity of the United
States); Department of Defense Directive 1015.1 (Aug. 18, 1991) (defining a NAFI
as an entity which "enjoys the legal status of an instrumentality of the United
States"); AFR 176-28 (entitled "Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Liability and Per-
sonnel Claims"), 2 (Aug. 27, 1990) (providing that "NAFIs are instrumentalities
of the Federal government and enjoy its privileges and immunities").
19 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988); see infra notes 49-62 and accompa-
nying text.
Walls, 832 F.2d at 94 n.2.
21 See AFR 215-12 (Sept. 5, 1988) (entitled "Air Force Aero Club Program");
OPNAVINST 1710.2E (May 24, 1993) (entitled "Navy Flying Club Program"); AR
215-2, Ch. 6, Sec. 12 (Sept. 10, 1990) (entitled "Army Flying Activities"); Marine
Corps Order [hereinafter MCO] P1710.16E (May 6, 1993) (entitled "Marine
Corps Aero Club Program Manual").
22 See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 1-4c(2) (Sept. 5, 1988); OPNAVINST 1710.2E,
105a(4)(b) (May 24, 1993).
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Constitution, and By-Laws.23
Although all military flying clubs have the same general
purpose, '4 there are many nuances among the publica-
tions of the four military services which could have legal
significance. Review of the applicable material should be
conducted to determine the policies and procedures of
the particular flying club at issue, and the specific duties
and responsibilities of club employees, contractors, and
members.
Generally, each flying club has a club manager, who is
responsible for day-to-day operations, a chief flight in-
structor, who supervises and monitors the activities of all
club instructors,25 and an advisory committee, 6 whose
function is to assist the club manager in operating the
club "in a safe, efficient and businesslike manner. '27 Vot-
ing members of the advisory committee include a presi-
dent, operations officer, safety officer, and maintenance
officer.28
D. MEMBERSHIP AND INCOME
Membership in a military flying club is generally open
to all active duty and retired military personnel and their
families, disabled veterans, reserve component and Na-
tional Guard members, military academy and ROTC ca-
23 See, e.g., MCO PI710.16E, $ 1003.3 (May 6, 1993) & Appendix A.
24 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 44 2-4 & 2-7 (Sept. 5, 1988). The chief flight instructor
is also responsible for developing an Operating Instruction (01) in the case of the
Air Force, id. $ 2-7, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in the case of the
Navy, OPNAVINST 1710.2E, 207 (May 24, 1993), to be used by all club
instructors.
26 Referred to as an Advisory Board by the Marine Corps, MCO PI710.16E,
2002 (May, 6, 1993), a Board of Directors (BOD) by the Navy, OPNAVINST
1710.2E, 204 (May 24, 1993), and an Advisory Committee (AC) by the Air
Force, AFR 215-12, 2-5 (Sept. 5, 1988).
27 See, e.g., OPNAVINST 1710.2E, 204c.
2K See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 4 2-6 (Sept. 5, 1988). The establishment of an advisory
committee for Army Flying Activities (AFAs) is optional, see AR 215-2, $ 6-142d
(Sept. 10, 1990) (providing that on "AFA may establish ad hoc or advisory com-
mittees per AR 215-1, Ch. 9"); however, the appointment of a safety officer, oper-
ations officer, maintenance officer, club manager, and chief flight instructor is
mandatory. See AR 215-2, $ 6-143 (Sept. 10, 1990).
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dets, foreign military personnel and their families
assigned to the sponsoring installation, active and retired
DOD civilians and their families, and other personnel who
support the DOD mission as authorized by the Installa-
tion Commander. 9
Income is derived from membership dues and assess-
ments, participation fees and charges for aircraft usage,
interest on investments, proceeds from property sales and
authorized resale activities.3 0 Aircraft are primarily ac-
quired either by purchase or exclusive-use lease from pri-
vate owners. They also may be acquired by loan of excess
DOD or General Services Administration aircraft.3 '
Although operated like a business, flying clubs generally
retain all income to finance club activities.3 2
E. FLIGHT TRAINING/SAFETY
Military flying clubs provide ground school and flight
instruction which prepare students to meet the perform-
ance standards contained in the applicable FAA Practical
Test Standards.3 3 Ground school and flight training pro-
grams are based on the curriculum in 14 C.F.R. Part 61,
entitled "Certification: Pilots and Flight Instructors," and
in 14 C.F.R. Part 141, entitled "Pilot Schools."' 34 Military
flying clubs may retain FAA certified flight instructors as
employees or as independent contractors.35
Military flying clubs also provide accident prevention
programs, which usually include safety meetings, the con-
struction and maintenance of safety bulletin boards, and
the placement of safety related materials in the Pilot In-
formation File (PIF),36 which is a binder maintained by
each flying club containing material of interest to all pi-
29 See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 2-9 (Sept. 5, 1988).
so See, e.g., id. i-3d.
31 See, e.g., id. 3-1, 3-3.
32 See, e.g., id. 1-3.
13 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 4-10 (Sept. 5, 1988).
35 See, e.g., id. 2-8.
U See, e.g., id. 5-1 through 5-5.
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lots, and which each pilot must read and initial.3 7 In addi-
tion, flying clubs maintain individual training records
which document pilot currency, training, attendance at
safety meetings, review of flight publications maintained
in the PIF, and test scores. 38
F. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
When a flying club aircraft is involved in an accident, as
defined by 49 C.F.R. Part 830, the governing military de-
partment will conduct a "mishap investigation." The pur-
pose of this investigation is to determine causes and
identify steps to prevent future accidents. The military of-
ficer assigned to conduct the mishap investigation is ex-
pected to work in close coordination with National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and/or International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) investigators. 9
G. INSURANCE
Each military service maintains its own insurance pro-
gram to cover third-party liability and hull damage in the
event of an accident or incident involving flying club activ-
ities. At the present time, significant differences exist be-
tween the Air Force's program and the cooperative
programs of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.4 °
1. The Air Force
The Air Force maintains a self-insurance fund and has a
deductible in its commercial policies in the amount of $1
million which the fund is designed to cover. Currently,
there are two commercial insurance policies covering
third-party liability exposure. The policies provide that
the Air Force shall have a $1 million self-insured retention
37 See, e.g., id. 4-2a.
38 See, e.g., id. 2-14.
39 See, e.g., id. 5-8.
40 Compare, e.g., AFR 215-12, 1-7 (Sept. 5, 1988) with OPNAVINST 1710.2E,
Ch. 8 (May 24, 1993).
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(SIR). Each policy then provides a $10 million layer of
coverage, for a total limit on liability of $20 million.4'
The SIR is an aggregate amount in any one contract year.
Named insureds include the United States, the U.S. Air
Force, the Aero Club, Aero Club employees, members,
contract flight instructors and mechanics, as well as au-
thorized patrons.
Aircraft hull insurance is provided for club-owned and
leased aircraft under the commercial insurance program.
The amount of hull insurance on leased aircraft is negoti-
ated by the Air Force with each individual owner. There
is no hull coverage for Government-owned aircraft used
by the aero club, but NAF-purchased equipment installed
on these aircraft is covered.
Although the Air Force purchases commercial liability
insurance to cover settlements and judgments in excess of
$1 million, the Air Force reserves the right to adjudicate
and defend all claims and litigation arising from aero club
activities. Under the terms of the commercial insurance
policy, the carrier must request permission from the Air
Force to participate actively in the defense of any aero
club litigation.
If a club member is sued in his or her individual capac-
ity for a tort committed or allegedly committed while par-
ticipating in an Aero Club activity, the Air Force may
authorize employment of civilian counsel to defend his or
her interests. 42 If the claim alleges patron or contractor
liability and the damages sought are in excess of $25,000,
the insurance carrier will normally be asked to resolve the
claim. Investigation, representation, and defense costs
are cumulative toward satisfying the SIR.
If the United States, the Air Force, the Aero Club, or a
Government employee acting within the scope of his or
4 As ofJanuary 1, 1994, the first layer is provided by the United States Aircraft
Insurance Group (USAIG) (not affiliated with the U.S. Government) of New York,
New York, and the second layer by Summerset Aviation, Inc., of Dallas, Texas.
4 AFR 178-28, 13 (Aug. 27, 1990). Under this regulation, legal representa-
tion by private counsel may be provided to other individuals as well.
19941 569
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her duties is sued in tort litigation arising from Aero Club
activities, defense is normally provided by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice (DOJ). Any settlement or judgment
arising from the alleged negligence of a nonappropriated
fund employee (someone hired by the Aero Club and paid
from nonappropriated funds) will be paid out of the self-
insurance fund and by the excess insurance carrier. On
the other hand, any settlement or judgment arising from
the alleged negligence of an appropriated fund employee
(an active duty military or federal civilian employee) will
be paid by the U.S. Treasury.
2. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps maintain "all risk"
commercial hull and aviation liability insurance. Named
insureds include the United States and all agencies
thereof, all Army Flying Activities, Navy Flying Clubs, and
Marine Corps Aero Clubs, including their individual
members, employees, and independent contractors (certi-
fied flight instructors and aircraft mechanics). Presently,
the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are all insured under
the same program, with individual policies written for
each service.43 Third-party liability coverage is limited to
$25 million with no deductible amount under the Navy
policy, and is limited to $10 million with no deductible
amount under the Army and Marine Corps policies. Air-
craft hull damage coverage includes a $1,000 deductible
per occurrence under the Navy and Marine Corps poli-
cies, and a $500 deductible per occurrence under the
Army policy.
All claims and litigation arising out of Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps flying club activities are presently defended
by the commercial insurance carrier, in consultation with
the DOJ and military department involved in the
litigation.
4" As of November 1993, coverage for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps is
also provided by USAIG.
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III. LITIGATION
A. TYPES OF CASES
Military flying club cases potentially involve complex
factual and legal issues, and may be further complicated
by allegations of negligence directed at other Govern-
ment entities. For example, in Bearden v. United States,4
Air Force Reservist Terry Hawkins, a private pilot, rented
a single-engine aircraft from the Maxwell-Gunter AFB
Aero Club in Montgomery, Alabama, for a recreational
cross-country flight to Las Vegas, Nevada. Contrary to
the flight plan which the Aero Club had approved, Haw-
kins embarked on a flight to Portland, Oregon. On the
fifth day of the flight, the plane crashed in the Columbia
River Gorge, near Hood River, Oregon, killing all six oc-
cupants. The estates of the pilot and passengers brought
wrongful death actions against the United States. Allega-
tions included negligent entrustment, supervision, main-
tenance and flight instruction by the Maxwell-Gunter AFB
Aero Club; inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading
weather briefings by the Redmond, Oregon, Flight Ser-
vice Station (FSS); and negligent performance of air traffic
control services by the Seattle, Washington, Air Route
Traffic Control Center (ARTCC).
The insurance carrier, which later went bankrupt, de-
nied insurance coverage for the pilot on the basis that his
negligence was "gross and willful." The passenger plain-
tiffs attempted to impute the pilot's negligence to the
United States on a "master-servant" theory.45 Four of the
five passengers had failed to execute a Covenant Not To
Sue and Indemnity Agreement as required by Air Force
regulations.46 After extensive discovery and considerable
motion practice, including a motion for sanctions in the
form of a default judgment against the United States,4 7
44 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,533 (N.D. Ala. 1988). This author was lead counsel for
the United States.
1- See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
17 In their motion for sanctions, plaintiffs alleged that the Government inten-
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the case proceeded to trial. In a 90-page decision, the
court completely exonerated the United States
Government.48
B. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The following unique issues should be considered in
handling military flying club cases:
1. The FTCA
As discussed previously,49 military flying clubs are
"nonappropriated fund instrumentalities" of the United
States. Therefore, the only valid jurisdictional basis for a
claim arising out of the alleged wrongful act or omission
of an employee of a military flying club acting within the
scope of his or her employment is the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA).5 ° Under the FTCA, the only federal entity
that can be sued is the United States. 5' Accordingly, a
tionally destroyed the aircraft's altimeter, negatives and photographs of the crash
site, and one of several tape recordings containing conversations between air traf-
fic controllers and the pilot. The motion was denied on several grounds, includ-
ing a lack of evidence of bad faith or willfulness on the part of the Federal
Government. See Bearden, 21 Av. Cas. at 17,535-37.
4, Bearden, at 17,533 (N.D. Ala. 1988). Specifically, the district court found that
the Maxwell-Gunter Aero Club was not negligent in: 1) entrusting the Club air-
craft to Hawkins, id. at 17,543; 2) failing to locate and ground Hawkins en route,
id. at 17,544; 3) providing Hawkins with a plane equipped with an allegedly defec-
tive altimeter, id. at 17,544-46; 4) failing to participate more fully in the flight, id.
at 17,543-44; 5) clearing the flight, id.; and 6) providing flight instruction to Haw-
kins, see id. at 17,543. The district court also found that the Redmond FSS did not
provide Hawkins with incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading weather informa-
tion. Id. at 17,546-48. Further, the court found that the Seattle ARTCC did not
fail to: 1) issue a "safety advisory;" 2) solicit and relay pilot reports; and 3) pro-
vide other allegedly pertinent air traffic control services to Hawkins. Id. at 17,548-
56. The court held that the sole cause of the crash was Hawkins' deliberately
flying into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) without an instrument rat-
ing. Id. at 17,565-66. The court concluded that it could not find "that the defend-
ant was negligent or that the conduct of Hawkins was reasonably foreseeable by
any agent of the defendant, or that any such agent violated a duty owed to any
plaintiff, or that any such agent's conduct was a substantial contributing factor in
the accident." Id. at 17,565 n.52.
49 See supra notes 16 and 18 and accompanying text.
-) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2G71-2680 (1988).
.sl See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 (definitions), 2679 (exclusiveness of remedy) (1988).
Suits against individual employees in their individual capacities will likely be ap-
FLYING CLUB LITIGATION
military flying club cannot be sued eo nomine either in fed-
eral or state court.
The case of Mignona [sic] v. Sair Aviation52 is instructive.
Mignona arose from the crash of a Mooney aircraft rented
from the Hancock Field Aero Club in New York. The pi-
lot, an FAA air traffic controller, brought suit in state
court against the Club for injuries he allegedly sustained
in the crash. After removal to district court, the case
against the United States was dismissed based on plain-
tiff's failure to file an administrative claim.53 On appeal,
the Second Circuit ruled sua sponte that removal was im-
proper and remanded the case to state court. 54 On re-
mand, the state court found that the Hancock Field Aero
Club shared in the sovereign immunity of the United
States, through its status as a nonappropriated fund in-
strumentality. 55 The court also found that the only possi-
ble waiver of sovereign immunity, the FTCA, explicitly
denies jurisdiction to state courts.56 Accordingly, the case
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Whether suing or defending the United States in tort
litigation arising from military flying club activities, con-
sideration should be given to all of the limitations and ex-
ceptions of the FTCA. For example, in Jay v. U.S.
Department of the Navy, 58 an aircraft belonging to the Atsugi
Navy Flying Club crashed at the U.S. Naval Air Facility,
propriate for removal to Federal court and substitution of the United States under
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), the Westfall statute. The procedures for representation of
Federal officials and employees by the Department ofJustice or by private counsel
furnished by the Department in civil proceedings in which Federal employees are
sued in their individual capacities are set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (1993).
52 No. 85-3675 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1992).
5 See Mignona [sic] v. Sair Aviation, No. 85-CV- 1158, slip. op. at 11 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 1986).
See Mignogna v. Sair Aviation, 937 F.2d 37, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that the state court action against the Aero Club was not subject to removal pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988) as an action against an "officer" of the
United States or of a federal agency).
55 Mignona [sic], No. 85-3675, slip op. at 4.
56 Id.
57 Id.
- No. 4-89-136-K (N.D. Tex. June 5, 1989).
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Atsugi, Japan. There were two fatalities: Major Albert J.
Calhoun, Jr., an active duty member of the United States
Army on temporary duty in Japan; and Mr. Yasumasa
Ogo, a Japanese national employed as an instructor at the
club. At the time of the accident, Major Calhoun was on
board the aircraft as a student.
Nickie Jay, as executrix of the estate of Major Calhoun,
brought a wrongful death action in Federal Court against
the U.S. Navy, the Atsugi Navy Flying Club, and Mr.
Ogo's estate. No action was brought against the United
States, and no administrative claim was filed within the
two-year statutory period under the FTCA. Accordingly,
the U.S. Navy, the Atsugi Navy Flying Club, and the estate
of Mr. Ogo moved for dismissal or alternatively for sum-
mary judgment. The following grounds were asserted:
1) that jurisdiction could only lie pursuant to the FTCA,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680;
2) that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679, the only proper
defendant would be the United States;
3) that the suit was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), as a
claim which arose in a foreign country;
4) that plaintiff failed to file an administrative claim and
therefore the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 2675(a);
5) that the suit was barred by the Feres doctrine, see Feres
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), because the
death of Major Calhoun occurred "incident to ser-
vice" in the military;5 9 and
6) that the Atsugi Navy Flying Club was a nonap-
propriated fund instrumentality of the United States;
that review of Mr. Ogo's employment contract indi-
cated that he was an employee of the Club and not an
independent contractor; that Mr. Ogo was clearly act-
ing within the scope of his employment at the time of
the accident; and that under the circumstances, Public
" Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment at I-
2, Jay v. U.S. Department of the Navy, No. 4-89-136-K (N.D. Tex. June 5, 1989).
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Law 100-649, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679, created an
exclusive remedy against the United States, notwith-
standing that such suit would be subject to
dismissal. 60
The United States also asked the court to deny
plaintiffs demand for punitive damages, prejudgment
interest, and a jury trial, on the ground that these
were expressly precluded under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2674 and 2402 (1988).61 After reviewing the
pleadings and supporting affidavit, the district court
dismissed the action against the U.S. Department of
the Navy and the Atsugi Navy Flying Club and en-
tered judgment in favor of the estate of Yasumasa
Ogo. 62
2. The Feres Doctrine
Tort actions commenced under the provisions of the
FTCA by a plaintiff who was on active duty in an armed
service at the time of the injury have long been controlled
by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Feres v. United
States.63 In that case, the Court held that "the Govern-
ment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service. ' ' 64 The
Court explained: "We know of no American law which
ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence,
against either his superior officers or the Government he
-" Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Sum-
mary Judgment at 3, Jay v. U.S. Department of the Navy, No. 4-89-136-K (N.D.
Tex. June 5, 1989).
61 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment at 2,
Jay v. U.S. Department of the Navy, No. 4-89-136-K (N.D. Tex. June 5, 1989).
62 SeeJay, No. 4-89-136-K, slip op. at 2. The district court stated that plaintiff
had agreed that she had no valid claim against the United States, the U.S. Navy, or
the Atsugi Navy Flying Club. Relying on the Government's affidavit concerning
Mr. Ogo's status, the court held that Mr. Ogo was an employee of the Club at all
relevant times. Therefore, he could not be sued in his individual capacity. Id. at
1-2.
- 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
-,, Id. at 146.
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is serving." 65 This rule, known as the Feres doctrine, was
reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,66 which held that the
United States could not be sued for indemnification for
damages paid by a third-party to a plaintiff who was a ser-
viceman injured incident to service.
Injuries to military members involved in flying club ac-
tivities have been held to be "incident to service. ' 68 In
Walls v. United States69 an active-duty service member of
the U.S. Army brought suit for injuries received as a pas-
senger in the crash of a Cessna 172 on lease to the Peter-
son AFB Aero Club in Colorado. The Seventh Circuit
held that plaintiff's suit was barred by Feres, emphasizing
that plaintiff was subject to military discipline while on
board the Aero Club aircraft (though off duty and on an
"out-of-bounds pass" at the time of the crash).7 0 The
court of appeals also stressed that plaintiff was taking ad-
vantage of privileges restricted to the military.7'
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Wood-
side v. United States.72 In that case, the court of appeals
held that a serviceman who was killed in a Hickman-
Wheeler AFB Aero Club airplane while on leave and re-
ceiving recreational flight instruction toward a commer-
cial pilot certificate was engaged in "activity incident to
service. 1 73 In holding that the case was barred by Feres,
the Sixth Circuit emphasized that membership in an aero
club is restricted to military or military related personnel;
that an aero club is a nonappropriated fund activity of the
65 Id. at 141.
431 U.S. 666 (1977).
67 Id. at 673-74.
- See Walls v. United States, 832 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1987); Woodside v. United
States, 606 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); Eckles v.
United States, 471 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
6 832 F.2d 93 (7th Cir.), aff'g, 651 F. Supp. 1049 (S.D. Ind. 1987). This author
defended the United States in the district court.
70 Id. at 96.
71 Id.
72 606 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
7. Id. at 142.
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Air Force established to promote the morale of service
members; and that aero club activities are governed by
Air Force regulations. 4 The Sixth Circuit also stressed
that aero clubs are subject to the supervision of the base
commander and are indirectly supported by the Air Force
through the use of Air Force facilities. 5
Likewise, in Eckles v. United States,76 Army Lt. Colonel
Eckles rented a Cessna 150 from the Carlisle Barracks
Army Aero Club for one last practice flight before taking
his private pilot checkride scheduled for the next day.
While apparently practicing stalls, and Lt. Col. Eckles was
killed. Suit was brought by his widow against the United
States alleging negligent flight instruction and supervi-
sion on the part of Aero Club employees. The district
court found that Lt. Col. Eckles could not have been an
aero club member unless a member of the armed forces,
and that a suit by a serviceman resulting from aero club
activities could lead to serious adverse effects regarding
military discipline." Concluding that Eckles' death arose
out of an activity incident to his military service,78 Chief
Judge William J. Nelson held that the suit was barred by
Feres.79
Participation in other types of DOD recreational activi-
ties also has been found to be "incident to service. '"80
These cases reiterate that "incident to service" is not a
narrow term restricted to military training, field maneu-
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 471 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
77 Id. at I11.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 110.
80 See, e.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) (riding a horse
rented from military riding stable); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th
Cir. 1966) (swimming in an on-base swimming pool); Mariano v. United States,
444 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Va. 1977) (at off duty job at recreation club owned by
Navy), affd, 605 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1979); Keisel v. Buckeye Donkey Ball, Inc., 311
F. Supp. 370 (E.D. Va. 1970) (riding a donkey during a ball game sponsored by
Special Services division of a Naval base); Richardson v. United States, 226 F.
Supp. 49 (E.D. Va. 1964) (trying to escort enlisted man, without specific request,
from Non-commissioned Officers' Club).
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vers, or combat situations; rather, it is a broad concept
encompassing all types of recreational activities, even
though the military member is not acting pursuant to or-
ders or subject to direct military command or discipline. 8 '
3. Imputed Negligence
Brucker v. United States,82 United States v. Hainline,83
Bearden v. United States84 and Visbeck v. United States,85 ad-
dress the issue of whether a flying club member who is
using a flying club airplane for a recreational flight is an
employee of the United States under the FTCA.
In Brucker the plaintiff sued the United States for inju-
ries sustained in the crash of an aircraft owned by the Cas-
tle AFB Aero Club in California. Plaintiff, a member of
the Club, had hired another Club member, Lt. Hammack,
whom the Club listed as a "check pilot," to give him a
check flight in preparation for a supervised solo. The
lower court found that the crash resulted from Lt. Ham-
mack's negligence, but that "Lt. Hammack was not acting
as an agent of the Club and hence not an agent of the
Government at the time of the flight in question." The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that the Club had no
contractual arrangements with Lt. Hammack, did not
compensate him, and neither possessed nor exercised
control over his conduct.86 Accordingly, the appellate
court held that Lt. Hammack's negligence could not be
imputed to the United States.87
The United States obtained a similar result in Hainline.
The plaintiff sued the United States for injuries she re-
ceived when a McConnell AFB Aero Club airplane flown
by an off-duty Air Force officer struck her car. The Tenth
Circuit held that, because the Air Force officer was off
"I See Woodside, 606 F.2d at 141.
112 338 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965).
,3 315 F.2d 153 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963).
,4 No. CV 85-PT-1995-S (N.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 1985).
11 Civ. No. ED-84-CA-136 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 1984).
8,, Brucker, 338 F.2d at 429.
87 Id.
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duty and flying the plane as a member of the Aero Club,
he was not an employee of the Club nor was he acting
within the scope of his employment with the military at
the time of the crash.8 8 The circuit court also noted that
an Air Force regulation, which purported to treat mem-
bers as employees for the purposes of administering ben-
efits or for accident investigation, did not make them
employees in determining the substantive liability of the
United States under the FTCA.a9 The status of such
members is a separate factual finding governed by federal
law.90
In Bearden the district court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the United States, finding that an off-
duty U.S. Air Force Reserve officer who was piloting an
aero club airplane for recreational purposes was not act-
ing within the scope of his military duties.9' Therefore,
the court would not impute his negligence to the United
States.9 2
In support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
the United States filed three affidavits stating that the pilot
was a member of the Maxwell-Gunter AFB Aero Club,
that he was not an employee of the Club, that he used the
plane for his own recreational purposes, and that he had
sole discretion over planning and executing the flight.
The affiants were the President of the Club, the Manager
of the Club, and the Commander of the Squadron to
which the pilot was assigned.
Finally, in Visbeck, a member of the U.S. Air Force
rented a Cessna 172 from the Goodfellow AFB Aero Club
in Texas for a recreational flight. The aircraft crashed
near El Paso, Texas. Plaintiff, a civilian and the only survi-
vor on board the aircraft, sued the United States for per-
sonal injuries, alleging pilot negligence. The United
98 Hainline, 315 F.2d at 156.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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States moved for summary judgment, asserting that the
pilot of the aircraft was not acting within the scope of his
office or employment with the Air Force at the time of the
crash. In support of its Motion, the United States submit-
ted affidavits which established that the pilot was not an
employee of the Aero Club and was not acting "in the line
of duty" at the time of the crash. In light of the uncontro-
verted evidence and the law set forth in Hainline, the dis-
trict court entered summary judgment in favor of the
United States.93
In several flying club cases, plaintiffs have attempted to
equate "incident to service" with "scope of employment"
in order to impute the negligence of a serviceman to the
United States.94 However, "incident to service" is defined
more broadly than "scope of employment. ' 95 As Chief
Judge William J. Nelson stated in Eckles: "It is not incon-
sistent that a serviceman be engaged in an activity inci-
dent to service according to federal law, such that Feres
applies, barring the action, and at the same time not be
acting within the scope of employment under applicable
state law." 96 The two tests involve different situations and
different concerns.9 7
4. Absolute Liability
Some jurisdictions impose liability by statute on the
owner of an airplane for the pilot's negligence even
though there was no negligence on the part of the
owner. 98 Such statutes, however, are not applicable in
93 Visbeck, No. 12D-84-CA-136, slip op. at 3.
q4 See, e.g., Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition at 15, Walls v. United States, 651 F.
Supp. 1049 (S.D. Ind.), afd, 832 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1987).
.5 See Eckles v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 108, 111 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See, e.g., Sanz v. Renton Aviation, Inc., 511 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1975);
Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481, 482 (5th Cir. 1955); Broadway v. Webb, 462 F.
Supp. 429, 431 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp.
681, 685 (D. Col. 1969); 8 Am. Jur. 2d Aviation, §§ 92-93 (1980); Joseph E. Ed-
wards, Vicarious Liability for Pilot's Negligence, 11 A.L.R. Fed. 901 (1972); K.J. Rob-
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FTCA cases involving Government-owned aircraft.99
5. Covenant Not To Sue and Indemnity Agreement
Any person who is not an active duty member of the
U.S. Armed Forces may not operate or ride in a military
flying club aircraft until he or she has executed a "Cove-
nant Not To Sue and Indemnity Agreement." A new cov-
enant must be signed annually. A parent or legal
guardian is required to execute the document on a mi-
nor's behalf. 0 0 The cases of Hardin v. United States'01 and
Kissick v. Schmierer"°2  address the validity of these
agreements.
Hardin arose out of the crash of an airplane owned by
Maxwell-Gunter AFB Aero Club. Suit was brought
against the United States by the estate of the decedent, a
passenger in the accident aircraft, alleging negligence on
the part of the Aero Club as well as other Government
entities.'0 3 Prior to the fatal flight, the decedent, who was
also the wife of the pilot, had signed an Air Force Form
1585, Covenant Not To Sue and Indemnity Agreement,
which stated:
In consideration of the Aero Club permitting me to par-
ticipate in these activities, I, for myself, my heirs, adminis-
trators, executors, and assignees, hereby covenant and
agree that I will never institute, prosecute, or in any way
demand, claim, or file suit against the U.S. Government
and/or its officers, agents, or employees, acting officially
erts, Tort Liability of One Renting or Loaning Airplane to Another, 4 A.L.R. 2d 1306,
1306-09 (1949).
- See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799-800 (1972) (FTCA precludes action
against the United States based upon strict or absolute liability); Kropp v. Douglas
Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (mere ownership of danger-
ous property does not make the United States liable under the FTCA, "since such
liability would be tantamount to imposition of absolute liability without regard to
negligence").
too See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 2-15 (Sept. 5, 1988).
10 No. CV 85-PT-2941-S (N.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 1986) (arising from the same
crash at issue in Bearden v. United States, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,533 (N.D. Ala.
1988)).
102 816 P.2d 188, 190-91 (Alaska 1991).
3 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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or otherwise, for any loss, damage, or injury to my person
or my property which may occur from any cause whatso-
ever as a result of my participation in the activities of the
Aero Club....
I understand and agree that I am assuming the risk of
any personal injury or property damage that may result
while participating in Aero Club activities, including such
injuries or damage as may be caused by the negligence of
the U.S. Government. 104
Applying Alabama law, the court held that the Cove-
nant had released the United States from any Aero Club
negligence, but refused to hold, as a matter of law, that
the Covenant had released the United States from the
negligence, if any, of other agencies, such as the FAA.'° 5
In Kissick the widows of three deceased passengers
brought wrongful death suits in state court against the es-
tate of a pilot, an Air Force Major, involved in the crash of
an Aero Club aircraft. The aircraft, owned by the Elmen-
dorf AFB Aero Club in Anchorage, Alaska, had crashed
into a mountain bordering Burns Glacier during a fishing
trip. The court held that a Covenant Not To Sue and In-
demnity Agreement signed by the three deceased civilian
passengers pursuant to Government regulations did not
bar claims against the estate of the pilot.'0 6 Under the
Covenant Not To Sue, the passengers agreed not to bring
a claim against the U.S. Government and/or its officers,
agents, or employees, or club members, for any loss, dam-
age, or injury to their persons or property. Applying
Alaska law, the court found that the Covenant was ambig-
uous because the word "death" was missing.'0 7 The
court, therefore, refused to uphold the validity of the
Covenant.108
- Hardin, No. CV 85-PT-2941-S, slip op. at 1.
,o0 Id. at 7.
106 Kissick, 819 P.2d at 191-92.
107 Id. at 190.
lom Id. at 191-92.
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6. The FECA
The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA)' °
requires the United States to "pay compensation ... for
the disability or death of an employee resulting from per-
sonal injury sustained while in the performance of his
duty. . . ."110 In general, FECA benefits are "exclusive
and instead of all other liability to the United States or the
instrumentality of the employee, his legal representative,
spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other person
otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United
States .... "' Therefore, the FECA may provide a de-
fense in certain military flying club cases. '1 2
7. Standard of Care
a. Guest Statutes
Military regulations permit individuals to be carried on
flying club aircraft as guests if they are personally and spe-
cifically invited by the pilot. 1,3 In military flying club cases
involving passengers, counsel should research state law to
determine whether a "guest statute" may be applicable.
Such statutes typically relieve the owner of an aircraft of
liability for injury to a guest unless the owner or operator
was grossly negligent." 14
b. Military Regulations
In addition to FARs, flying club members must comply
1- 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1988).
110 Id. § 8102(a).
'I" Id. § 8116(c). In addition, the FECA may bar third-party claims against the
United States for contribution and indemnity when the underlying plaintiff is eli-
gible for FECA benefits. See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460
U.S. 190, 197-98 (1983). The FECA may also apply to certain non-federal em-
ployees killed or injured while assisting the Federal Government in, for example,
search and rescue missions. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8141 (1988) (concerning
volunteers).
112 For example, the FECA may apply to a federal civilian employee who is per-
forming a maintenance check or flight examination, or participating in a search
and rescue mission, or traveling on TDY in a flying club aircraft.
-, See, e.g., AFR 215-12, 4-5k (Sept. 5, 1988).
" See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.115 (1989).
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with military regulations and requirements in operating
club aircraft." 5 Military regulations and requirements are
sometimes more restrictive than FAA regulations."t 6 Air
Force regulations, for example, require at least an hour
fuel reserve on VFR flights; the FARs require only 30
minutes. Air Force regulations require three miles visibil-
ity for day VFR flight; the FARs are less restrictive with
regard to certain classifications of airspace. Air Force
Aero Club pilots must adhere to certain crew duty-day
limitations; must file flight plans for VFR cross-country
flights; and may not fly at night outside the local area if
non-instrument rated. No such restrictions exist under
the FARs." t7
It is well established that the FARs prescribe only "min-
imum standards of safety for aircraft personnel.""18 Be-
cause military regulations and requirements frequently
prescribe higher standards than the FARs, this could have
an impact on the applicable standard of care.
Bearden v. United States 19 addressed this issue in the con-
text of a negligent entrustment claim. In that case, Air
Force Reservist Terry Hawkins, a private pilot, rented a
Piper Arrow owned by the Maxwell-Gunter Aero Club
(MGAC) for a recreational cross-country flight. 2 0
Although Hawkins was not current in terms of takeoffs
and landings under Air Force regulations,' 2' the MGAC
Clearing Authority inadvertently cleared the flight. In ad-
dition, the MGAC Clearing Authority did not ensure that
115 See, e.g., AFR 215-12, Ch. 4 (Sept. 5, 1988).
116 Bearden v. United States, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,533, 17,544 (N.D. Ala.
1988).
17 Compare AFR 215-12, 4-5 (Sept. 5, 1988) with 14 C.F.R. Part 91 (1993).
118 See, e.g., In Re Aircrash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d
67, 75 (2d Cir. 1980).
119 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,533 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
120 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
12, Hawkins was not current in takeoffs and landings in the accident airplane
under AFR 215-12, 4-20(b), which required three takeoffs/landings in the same
make and model aircraft within the preceding 60 days. Hawkins only had two.
Hawkins, however, was current in takeoffs and landings under FAA Regulations,
specifically 14 C.F.R. § 61.57, which required three takeoffs/landings within the
preceding 90 days (Hawkins had 10). Bearden, 21 Av. Cas. at 17,538-39.
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Hawkins had conducted the planning set forth in the
Club's locally-generated "Checklist for Clearing
Authority."
In rejecting plaintiffs' allegation of negligent entrust-
ment, the court stated: "While MGAC makes an attempt
to hold its members to perhaps higher than FAA stan-
dards, it does not become an insurer, assume the respon-
sibilities placed on the pilot, nor become his guardian." 2 2
The court stressed that "Hawkins was responsible for his
own clearing at each airport from which he took off [dur-
ing the cross-country];" and that "[t]he checklist is, in ef-
fect, a series of reminders, all of which a licensed qualified
pilot can reasonably be expected to know."'' 23 The court
also emphasized that "Hawkins would have been qualified
to rent a similar plane from any non-governmental plane
rental entity and fly strictly under FAA regulations."'' 24
IV. CONCLUSION
As "nonappropriated fund activities," military flying
clubs are instrumentalities of the United States. For that
reason, employees of military flying clubs are considered
employees of the Federal Government for the purposes of
the FTCA. Therefore, consideration must be given to the
application of the FTCA in military flying club cases.
Effective management of military flying club litigation is
dependent upon an initial determination of the status of
the plaintiff(s) and alleged tortfeasor(s). This determina-
tion has the following implications: 1) if the alleged
tortfeasor was a Government employee acting within the
scope of his or her employment, any suit arising from his
or her negligence, if any, must be brought against the
United States under the FTCA; 2) if the alleged tortfeasor
was acting outside the scope of his or her employment
with the Federal Government, his or her negligence, if
any, cannot be imputed to the United States; 3) if the al-
122 Bearden, 21 Av. Cas. at 17,544.
123 Id.
1'4 Id. at 17,544 n.13.
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leged tortfeasor was not acting as an agent of the Federal
Government (e.g. contract flight instructor or mechanic),
his or her negligence, if any, cannot be imputed to the
United States; 4) if the plaintiff (e.g. pilot or passenger)
was acting "incident to service," his or her action against
the United States is barred by Feres; 5) if the plaintiff is
eligible for FECA benefits, he or she may not maintain an
action in tort against the Federal Government; 6) if the
plaintiff executed a Covenant Not to Sue and Indemnity
Agreement, his or her suit, not only against the United
States, but against any other party named in the Cove-
nant, may be subject to dismissal; and 7) if the plaintiff
was a "guest passenger," he or she may be faced with a
heavier burden of proof in establishing flying club
liability.
Military flying club cases frequently present challenging
factual and legal issues. Each case should be analyzed on
an individual basis with consideration given to the issues
and guidelines set forth in this article.
